Embattled & Embedded

Tomorrow, the Naval Institute Press will publish former Marine officer Wesley Gray's account of his seven months advising the Iraqi Army. Since General Petraeus' strategy for success in Iraq and Afghanistan includes building up capable indigenous security forces, Gray's reflections on his own experiences in that regard are worth a careful reading. I believe that the author is too cynical about Iraqi culture and too pessimistic about Iraq's future prospects, but who knows? The future is a moving target.

Embedded: A Marine Corps Adviser Inside the Iraqi Army, by Wesley Gray. Naval Institute Press, $28.95 (272p) ISBN 978-1-59114-340-6

Former Marine officer and Iraqi War veteran Gray saw a lot during his seven months as an adviser to the Iraqi Army. What he didn't see was the future. Nobody can, of course. But, that doesn't stop him from venturing into the void.

In mid-2006, Gray was assigned to a MiTT (Military Transition Team) team embedded within a battalion of the Iraqi Army in Al Anbar Province in western Iraq. Their mission was "to train, support, and advise the IA [Iraqi Army]." That turned out to be a frustrating challenge.

Despite pre-deployment training for their mission in Hawaii and in-country training in Iraq, Gray and his teammates were overwhelmed by what they found awaiting them. "[Nothing] can prepare anybody," he writes, "for the levels of ineptitude, laziness, and lack of motivation rampant in the Iraqi army."

What follows is a litany of complaints: Iraqi officers use their soldiers as servants; the logistics system is "inept and corrupt'; Iraqis "are glorified beggars" and employ "selective hearing"; there are "few true Iraqi patriots"; torture is "part of Iraq"; and laziness is endemic and epidemic. To his credit, Gray offers ample testimony to support his charges. And, he tries to put his conclusions in context: Laziness, he concludes, is "a survival mechanism" in a hostile environment.

As the only member of the MiTT team who spoke Arabic, Gray spent many hours socializing with the Iraqis. He seems to have been tolerated if not liked, and the troops gave him an affectionate nickname: "Jamal."

The Iraqis loved to talk about sex, but the author found them sexually illiterate. One reason was that they got much of their information from internet pornography. How was it, they asked Gray, that American men were so well endowed and could perform so long? When Gray tried to explain that porn actors tended to be above average in size and that the movies were edited to prolong the action, his audience was not convinced.

By the end of his tour, a disillusioned Gray had come to believe that the U.S. is "wasting time and resources in Iraq," and that a civil war is inevitable once the Americans depart. He concludes that the Iraqis "probably never will be successful."

Events might yet prove Gray right. But, for the moment, a stable and prosperous Iraq remains a viable possibility. The recent successful provincial elections and continued security gains are steps in the right direction.

There appears to be a consensus among the military and political leadership that success in Iraq and Afghanistan depends upon building up competent security forces (police and military) in those nations. The MiTT teams are on the front lines of that effort.

Despite his pessimism, Gray's unvarnished memoir is a revealing look at the enormous challenges facing MiTT teams in this Long War. Read as a cautionary tale, it's a valuable contribution to our ongoing assessment of the way forward in Iraq.

With luck, a critical mass of Iraqis will surprise the author and embrace the future. Maybe, after all, Iraqi culture is less deterministic and Iraqi society less static than Gray assumes.

QUOTABLE

"'The only time a woman is allowed on top in Iraq is in the bedroom.'"

"Those who succeed in Iraq learn to deal with Iraqi culture; those who fail in Iraq try to change Iraqi culture."

"[S]ix sleeping bags were filled with Iraqis, dreaming about pork chops and unveiled women."

"In their [Iraqis] mind, lazy people are wise people."

"Relying on Iraqis for anything besides a cup of chai (tea) with heavy sugar was rarely solid advice."

"Sure, they [Iraqis] were selfish, lying, untrustworthy, backstabbing, begging bastards for the most part, but they were my friends."